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In this pa.per we study a game of timing that is based on the in-
terpretation of the Shapley value as the players enter one by one. It
is shown that in this game there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium.
This Nash Equilibrium is explicitly given.
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11 Introduction.
This paper investigates a non-cooperative game that is based on the entrance-
iutcrprctation of thc Shaliley valuc.
Oue story that is told in textbooks to introduce the Shapley value is as
follows. Thc players of the grand coalition enter onc by one. When a player
enters he will get lris marginal contribution to the coalition that is already
present. If each order of entrance has the same probability then the Shapley
value is the expected payoff to the players.
In this paper we study whether the assumption that each order of entrance
is equally likely is justified if playcrs choose their entry time strategically.
To that end we study the (non-cooperative) Shapley entrance-game that
we introduce in Section 2. In this game each player independently selects
an entrance time. The payofF of a player is his marginal contribution with
regard to the cooperative garne (N, v) , discounted over time. It is assumed
that the discount parameter is the sarne for each player. In this paper only
the two player model is analyzed. This model defines a game of timing which
is called "silent" [see I(arlin (1959)]. r
In Section 3 a Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies is explicitly given. lt
is shown that this Nash Equilibrium is unique. The payoffof the Nash Equi-
librium is independent of the discounting parameter and is not efrcient with
regard to the cooperative game (N, v). In particular, the Nash equilibrium
payo(f does not coincide with the Shapley-value.
2 The Shapley-Entrance Game
In ttris section the non-cooperative S}rapley-Entrance Game (SEG)is defined.
Let (N, v) be a two person cooperative game such that v(I )- a, v (2)- Q
and v(N )-1 and a~ O, Q~ 0 and a-}- p~ 1. Taking (N, v) fixed, the
SEG is defined as follows. The set of pure strategies of player i is S; -[0, oo)
where t; E S; represents the time player i will enter. If (tr, t~) is a strategy
pair, then the payofF function of player 1 is
rAnother type of garnes of timing are the "noisy" games. In such game the payofio[
the follower depends only on when the other player moves. An exarnple of such a game is
the War oC Attrition [see liendricks et aL ( 1988)~
2abt~ t, G t~
~i(ti, ts) - {p~ ~ ( 1 - p)(f - Q)}b`' ti - ts
(f - Q)b~~ t, ~ t,
and of player 2
(1 - a)b~~ t, G t,
~scti, ts) - {p(1 - a) -}- (1 - P)Q}b`' ti - tz
ab'~ t, ~ t,
Ilence each player receives I~is discounted rnarginal coutribution, where
p E[0, 1] is the probability that player 1 has to enter the room first when
the arrival times of both players are identical. Further we suppose that the
discounting parameter satisfies O C b G 1.
A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution. Let X; be
the (arrival-)time of player i with probability distribution function F;(x) -
P[X; G x] . For convenience we define q;(x) - P[X; - x]. The payoff of
player 1 playing x when player 2 plays the mixed strategy F~ is given by
~i(~, Fs) - f ~i(~, y) dFs(y)
(o,~)
-~~Y
abr dF2(y) t f~Y(1 - Q)bx dF~(y)
-}- bs{pa -}- (1 - p)(1 - Q)}q2(x)
- bs{~ -~ (1 - ~ - ,0)Fs(x)} - brp(1 - ~ - ,Q)92(~) (1)
This implies that t}ie payofF of player 1 playing F, when player 2 plays F2 is
given by
~r,(r~,, Fz)
b~{a -}- (1 - a - (3)F~(x)} - bxp(1 - a: - Q)qx(~) dFl(~) - (o ~)
bz{a f(1 - a- Q)Fz(x)} dF,(z)
- (o ~l
- ~ óip(1 - a - Q)42(~)9i(2) (2)
3Analogously we find for player 2




f ( 1 - a- Q)Fi(y)} dF~(y)
- ~ bY(I - P)(1 - a - Q)9i(y)qs(y) (4)
In this paper we only present the results for player 1. The results for player
2 are obtained if the set of ordered symbols (a, ,Q, 1, 2, x, y, p) is replaced by
(Q~ a, 2,1, y, ~, 1- p).
Assume there exists a NE (Pi, P~) in mixed strategies with payoff ( rti, rt2).
The first lemma shows a general property of a NE. When player 1 has a
masspoint in t and player 2 plays tlre equilibrium strategy P2 then player 1
is indifferent between playing the pure strategy t or his equilibrium strategy
P~.
Lemma 1 Ij (P~, P2) is a NG with q~(t) ~ 0 then ~rr(Pl, P2) - nr(t,PZ) .
PROOF: Suppose player 1 has a masspoint in t and ~rr(t, P~) G ar(Pr, Pz).
Froui the definition of a NE follows that rrr(t', P~) G ~r~(1~, f2) b't'. This
implies that rtr - ~r~(Pr, P~) G(1 - qr(t))rt~ ~ q~(t)~rr(t, P2) G qr. Contradic-
tion. p
3 NE of Shapley-entrance game
In this section we Grst discuss the existence of a NE and secondly we prove
uniqueness of the N l~.
It is obvious that t}re SEG has no pure NE. Suppose there exists a pure
NE (t~, t~) . When t; G t~ then player j is better of with playing t' E(t;, t~).
Tliis means that tr - t2. But then at least one player has the incentive to
arrive later. Tliis proves:
4Proposition 1 The Sliaple~-ent~unce game has no pure NE.
hrom Proposition 1 it follows that a NE, i[ it exists, is one in mixed
strategies. Before proving our theorems we derive some conditions upon NE
(Pl, Pz) with payofF (rlr, r!z) .
The second lernma gives an inequality that follows immediately from the
definition of a Nl~,.
Lemma 2 Let (P1,Pz) Ge a NE with payo,(j(rlr,riz). Then
Pr(~) - 9r(~)(1 - p) C (I q2g Q~)3y tl ~ E[O, oo)
PaooF: Follows by substitution of rl2 - arz(Pl, Pz) ~~z(Pr, x) in (3) O
In the next lemma we show that it is not possible that both players have
a masspoint at time t. Intuitively this is clear. If player I enters the room
at time t it is better for player 2 to wait a little longer.
Lemma 3 In a NE holds qi(t).qz(t) - 0 dt E[O,oo).
PROOF: Suppose that both ql(t) ~ 0 and Qz(t) 1 0.
If p~ 0 then there exists an e) 0[Pz is a non-decreasing function) such
that qz(t 1- e) - 0 and ó`{a -F (1 - a-~)Pz(t) - p(1 - oí - Jj)qz(t)} C
b't`(a f (I - a- fj)Pz(t ~- e)) - ~rr(t -1- e, Pz) . But then lemma 1 implies
~r(Pl, Pz) -~r(t, Pz) C~r(t ~- e, Pz) . Contradiction. If p- 0 the proof is
siniilar. p
'I'he following lemma shows us that the supports of the equilibrium strate-
gies are defined on an interval with the same finite upperbound.
Lemma 4 The upper endpoints of tloe supports of lhe stralegies of a NE in
the SEC coincide.
PROOF: Let c E R be such that b~(I - p) - t71. Then Pl(c) - I.
Let d E R such that bd(1 - cr) - riz. Then Pz(d) - 1.
Suppose that c 1 d then player 1 has an incentive to play a strategy with
support (d, c) because on Lhe interval (d, c) he gets bs(1 -~i), ~ E (d, c).
5T}iis yields a greater payolF tfian the equilibrium payoff. Contradiction. So
c C d. On account of symmetry holds d C c. Analogously can be shown that
c- inf{x ~ P;(x) - 1}. - ~
Lemma 4 imrnediately implies
Corollary 1 In the SEG the payojj(p~, q2) oj a NE satisfies
rl~ 1 - i~
rJz - 1 - cr
The payoff of player 1 is bounded above by 1-,0. This payoff is the supre-
~num of player 1's payoff. T}iis can be shown by choosing the pure strategy
t- 0 for player 2 and the strategy t- e for some small e~ 0 for player 1.
Analogously 1- a is tlie supremum of player 2's payoff. The corollary shows
now that tlie payoff in any equilibrium is equal to the proportion of these
upperbounds.
In the next theorem we show the existence of a NE in the SEG. We restrict
attention to the case a G,Q. The case Q G a follows by a similar arguments.
Theorem 1 IJ a G Q then lhe Shapley-ent~unce game has a Nash Equilib-
rium given 6y the slrategy- pnir :
0-A6~
fÍ (x) - (~-a-R)6:
1 x~C
O C x C c
and
P(~-P)-a(~-a)6' p G x P~ (x) (~-a)(~-tr-R)S:
- 1 x1c
wilh c such that b`(1 - a) -(i . Moreover, the payoff is given by
~(Pi,Pz)- ~(1 -~3,1-cr).
6PnOOF: Note that f'i and 1z are distribution functious.
It sufTices to show that
~r(~,Pí)-~z(Pi,l2) HxE(O,c),
~rz(x, Pz) G rrl(Pi, P2) t1x E {0} U(c, oo) and
nz(Pi, x) - ~rz(Pi , Ps ) t1x E [0, c] ; az(Pi, x) G~rz(Pi , Pz )`dx E (c, oo)
The proof ot these inequalities follows by straightforward calculations (use
(1) and (3) and the definition of c). O
Wc coucludc~ that whcu Lhc discouiiting parati~ctcr ó bcconrc largcr thc
supports of the equilibrium strategies of the last theorem becomes larger.
Surprisingly the equilibrium payoff is independent of the discounting param-
eter. So , when the players play accordingly the above NE, the discounting
parameter ó can only affect the duration of the game, but not the payoff
of the players. In other words this mcans that both players become more
patient when the discount factor becomes larger.
The question arises if there are other NE's for the SEG. The next theorem
shows that all NE's rnust have the same payoff as the NE in Theorem 1. Thus
we have uniqueness in payoffs.
Theorem 2 In the Slzapley-entrance game tl:ere does rtot exist a NE (Gr, Gz)
with payo,(j (tir, pz) ~(itr, rtz) , where (rJr, t)z) is the payo,(J~ oJ the NE given
in Tlzeorem 1.
PROOF: Assume tliere exists an equilibrium (Gzi Gz) with payoff (tzr, tcz)
such that (tzz,lrz) ~ ( rlr,~z) .
Since (GziGz) is an equilibrium ~-~( Corollary 1). Ilence (tZr,tZZ) G
(r]z, ~z) or (pz, {zz) ~ (~r, ~z) [componentwise ordering].
The first case, (tzl, {zz) G ( rlr, riz) , is not possible because of Theorem 1
and since player two can guarantee himself ,0 by switching to the pure strat-
cgy t - 0.(Note if (i G a then player one is bctter of by switching to thc pure
strategy t - 0).
Thc case (tel, tZZ) )(rtr, rtz) nceds more explanation.
Lemma 4 implies that tlrere exists a c' ) 0 such that ê`'(1 -~i) - tzl and
ó`'(1 - a) - pz and Gz(c') - Gz(c') - I. Now we can show by straightíor-
7ward calculation 2 that the following inequalities hold:
[-f~r -f- ó~{a -f- (1 - a - ~i)Gz(t)}Jqr(t) ? o vt E [o, ~'] (5)
[-l~~ -1- ói{,Q f (1 - cr - (j)Gr(~)}]qs(t) ? o ~ít E [o, c'] (6)
Let r` - inf{x E[O,c'] ~ G~(x) ~ 0} and s' - inf{x E[o,c`] ~ Gz(x) ] 0}.
(i) Suppose r` G s'.
From (5) and (p~, ~l~) )(r)~, r)z) ~(a, (j) follows that qr(r') - 0. This implies
that Gr is continuous in r'.
For any e) o we define z~ - inf{x E[O,c'] ~ Gr(x) ) e}. Let e' be such that
z~. C s'. Then analogous to the calculation of (5),(Note that G2(z~,) - 0),
follows:
~r - f b~{a -}- (1 - a- p)Gz(x)} dGr(x)
[~'.~'1
C [ó~~ ~ - Ilr]Gi(z~~) ~ frr
'I'his last inequality shows that G~(z~.) - 0. This contradicts the definition
of r`, since z~, ~ r'.
(ii) Suppose r' 1 s'.
Analogous argumerits as used in (i) give a contradiction to this assumption.
(iii) Suppose r' - s'.
From Lemma 3 , (5) , (G) , and (pr,l~s) ~ (rlr,qs) ? (a,Q) follows qr(r') - 0
and q2(r') - 0. So G~ and GZ are continuous in x- r'. So for any e' ~ 0
there exists a ó' ~ 0 such that G~(x) c e' dx E [r', r` ~ ó']. Then holds
pr C f óz{a ~- (1 - a- Q)G2(x)} dGr(x) f {1 - Gr(r' ~- ó')}~r
[r..r~ fa.l
C[ó''{a~(l - cY-Q)c'} -lii]Gr(r'fó')~{ii
So for su(f'icicnt small c' holds C~ (r` -} ó') - 0. This contradict the dcfini-
tion of r' .
Hence (i), (ii) and (iii) do not hold by the assumption that (~rr,ps) 1(qr,ps).
ZCor equation (5) use (2), split the integration-interval in a point and the remaining
interval, then use lemrna 2
8This completes the proof. p
Tlieorem 2 enables us to prove the uniqueness of the NE of Theorem 1.
Again we restrict our attention to the case a G(j.
Theorem 3 If a C Q ihen (P~, P2) is the unique NE ojthe Shapley-entrance
game.
PROOF: Suppose that (Gr , GZ) is a NE. The proof is given in four steps:
(i) We first prove: G; C P;.
From Theorem 2 it follows that ~r(Gr,Gz) -(prl ~,Q). Then Lemma 4
implies that the right endpoint of the supports of P; and G; coincide. Hence
P;`(x) - G;(x) Flx E (c, oo) with c defined as in Lemma 4.
From Lemma 2 it follows that
C~(x) - q~(x)(1 - p) G Pi(x) Vx E[O,c]
Let A:- {x ~ q~(x) ~ 0}. Tlren (7) implies that
Gr(x) C Pi (x) `dx E [O,c]`A
(7)
(8)
Suppose there exists a x' E[O,c) such that Gl(x') ) Pi(x'). Hence there
exists an e~ 0 such that
Gr(x~`) - Pi (x~) -f- e (g)
Since Pi is continuous , there exists a b 1 0 such that tlx E (x', x' ~ b) holds
Pi (x) - Pi (x~) C 2E (10)
Let z E (x', x' -f b)`A then
Cr(z) C Pi (z) G Pi(x') i- 2e C G~(x')
Note that the first inequality holds by (8), the second by (10), the third by
(g). Since Gr is non-decreasing we have a contradition. Analogously we can
prove that G2 C P2.
(ii) We show here: C; - f;' a.e. C,~ , with i~ j.
Easy calculations sliow that
9.l,r,.~,
ór{Q -~ (1 - c~ - Q)G,(x)} dC2(x)
- Io ~] óz{,Q ~- (1 - a - (j)Pi (x)} dGz(x)
This integral-equalíty and (i) yields (ii) for i- 1 and j- 2. When i- 2 and
j- 1 the prove is analogously (Note that G,(0) - 0).
(iii) Now we show: G, is continuous on [0, c] and G2 is continuous on (0, c].
Suppose G, is not continuous. T}ren there exists a z E (0, c] such that
q,(z) - e~ 0. Since P~ is continuous on [0, c], there exists a ó~ 0 such that
bx E(z - ó, z] holds
~'i (z) - ~'i(x) C ~E
'I'hen for all x E(z - ó, z) holds
G'~(x) C Gi(z-) - c,(x) - q,(z) - cl(x) - e
GPi(z)-eGPi(z)-2E-Pi(x)
From (ii) and the last inequality follows that G2({(z-ë, z)}) - 0. Hence Gz is
constant on (z-ó, z). Since qi(x) ~ 0 Lemma 3 implies that q~(z) - 0. FIence,
G2 is constant on (z - ó, z]. This irnplies that G2(x) G P2 (x) bx E(z - ê, x].
From (ii) follows that G~({(z - ó,z]}) - 0. This implies that Gr({z}) - 0.
Since G,({z}) - q,(z) we have a contradiction.
Analogously we can show that GZ is continuous on (0, c].
(iv) Finally wc prova C; - I;'.
Suppose there exists a z E(O,c] such that G,(z) c P;(z). Since G, is con-
tinuous there exists an interval [a,6] that contains z and satisfies G,(a) -
P~ (a),G,(b) - P~ (b) and G,(x) c P~(x) tlx E (a,b). Then (ii) implies
that G~({(a,b)}) - 0. Since G~ is continuous on (O,c] it follows that G2 is
constant on (a,b] and C2(x) G fz(x) bx E(a,6]. [Icnce G~({(a,b]}) - 0.
This irnplies that G'~ is constant on (a,b] and G,(x) G Pl(x) bx E(a, b].
Contradictiori. Analogously is shown that G~ - P~. ~
10The equilibrium payoff (~~t,r~z) is not efficient in view of the cooperative
game. So the Shapley-entrance game does not yield the Shapley-value as
the equilibriurn outcome. `I'his rncans that when players can choose their
entrance time strategically, they cannot choose an equilibrium strategy that
supports the Shapley value.
4 Conclusion.
In this paper we analyzed the 5hapley-entrance game, a game based on the
entrance-interpretation of the Shapley value. We explicitly gave a NE and
proved that it is unique. P'urther we showed that the equilibrium payo(f was
independent of the discounting parameter and inefl'icient with regard to the
cooperative game (N, v). This result did not support the Shapley value.
Note that the Shapley value is implemented by the SEG if a} Q- 1.
Proposition 2 If a-{- Q- I then (o, 0) is the unique NE oj the Shapley-
enlrance game. Tlae payoQ' oj lhe NE equals lhe Shapley value.
PROOF: From (1) and (3) follows that ~rt (x, Fz) - aóz and a~(Fr, x) - Qbs.
Easy calculations show that (0, 0) is the unique NE with payoff (a, ~3) -~(v).
0
Since the Shapley value is independent of a discounting parameter, the
reader may be curious about the SEG with ó- 1. This curiosity is provided
in t}re next proposition.
Proposition 3 If ó- 1 lhen llrere does not exist a NE in the Shapley-
enlrance game.
PROOF: Suppose player two plays FZ. Then player one can guarantee himself
a payoff of 1- Q- e by playing the pure strategy x such that F2(x) - 1- e.
Analogously player two obtains 1- a- e. This is a contradiction since E~ 0
is arbitrary. p
[Ience the SEG with no discounting does not implement the Shapley-
valuc.
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